Disruption to Shipping

The security environment in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean has deteriorated significantly since mid-November 2023, when the Houthis, a Yemen-based militant group, began actively targeting merchant shipping. Commercial traffic through the Suez Canal has since declined by an approximate 66 per cent, leading to major disruptions in global shipping that have strained supply chains, extended shipping times and contributed to port congestion.

Houthi Attacks

Between 19 November 2023 and 08 October 2024, it is estimated that the Houthis have been involved in around 146 major security incidents targeting commercial vessels. These incidents mainly consist of attacks using anti-ship missiles (including cruise and ballistic variants), uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and uncrewed surface vehicles (USV). Additionally, there have been vessel approaches, naval harassment (such as radio threats), visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS), as well as attempted VBSS operations. Most incidents have occurred in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; however, incidents have occurred in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Map Data: Maritrace

During this period, at least 106 incidents have involved explosions

At least 46 of these incidents have resulted in varying degrees of damage to commercial vessels

Analysis of Attacks

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Since the start of the year, Houthi attacks have become more sophisticated, with the group deploying combinations of weapons systems. Since June, the group has also been utilising uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) with increasing effectiveness. USVs have also been employed as part of complex attacks.

Analysis of Attacks

Click on the image to enlarge

Despite ongoing airstrikes targeting the Houthis in Yemen, the group continues to possess the ability to carry out attacks on commercial vessels and Israel. As illustrated by the graphic above, they have sustained a high frequency of launches. Notably, since 30 June 2024, CENTCOM has intercepted several USVs, highlighting the increasing threat posed by these weapons systems.

Resurgence of Somali Piracy

Boardings and hijackings by Somali pirates between mid-November 2023 and 08 October 2024

Since mid-November 2023, there has been a resurgence of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. This resurgence is attributed to factors including increased foreign fishing in Somali waters and Houthi-linked maritime insecurity. The return of pirates has been marked by aggressive tactics, including attempted boardings, hijackings, and even the successful holding of an international merchant vessel for ransom, the first such incident since 2012. Small fishing vessels and dhows have been the most affected as they lack countermeasures such as armed security. Attack trends in March, May and June indicate that the threat may be spreading south. However, naval operations, such as the CTF 151 and ongoing patrols by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, the Indian Navy, and Chinese naval forces, may limit the threat. Additionally, the development of regional maritime security capabilities, supported by initiatives like EUCAP Somalia, and the existence of anti-piracy laws enabling prosecution and imprisonment of pirates, further mitigate the risk. However, internal and regional instability and the success of capacity building measures will also inform the complexity of the threat going forward.

Map Data: Maritrace

Forecast

Threat to shipping and submarine cables

The Houthis have demonstrated effective deployment of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). Should they expand their capabilities to include unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), the threat profile will escalate considerably. Both USVs and UUVs are capable of targeting vessels at or below the waterline, increasing the probability of critical damage and potential sinking. Moreover, the strategic risk is heightened in the Bab el Mandeb Strait, where the USV threat is particularly concentrated. In the event of a vessel sinking in this narrow and vital maritime corridor, there is a credible risk of collateral damage to submarine communication cables, as historical precedent has shown. This scenario would not only impact maritime operations but also disrupt global communication infrastructure, amplifying the strategic and operational consequences of such attacks.

Armed clashes, interceptions, air strikes, attacks, explosives and shelling incidents in Israel between 07 October 2023 and 04 October 2024

The security environment in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, in particular, is inextricably linked to ongoing tensions in the Middle East which show no signs of abating. Israel is currently engaged in a multi-front war that has shown clear signs of escalation.

Map Data: ACLED

Destroyed buildings (marked in red) in Gaza highlight areas of significant conflict

On 01 July, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel is nearing the completion of its efforts to dismantle Hamas' military capabilities in Gaza. Conversely, Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s National Security Advisor, stated the Gaza offensive is anticipated to last until at least the end of 2024. Israel's two strategic objectives in Gaza are to dismantle Hamas's military and governing infrastructure and to secure the release of the hostages. In relation to the first objective, Israel claims to have killed or wounded about 14,000 Hamas combatants including senior figures and dozens of lower-level leaders. However, others argue that Hamas retains significant strength. According to analysis by the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project, the Institute for the Study of War and CNN, nearly half of Hamas’ military battalions in northern and central Gaza have rebuilt some of their fighting capabilities. Additionally, although more than half of the hostages have returned from Gaza, more than 100 hostages remain in Gaza at the time of reporting.

Data: UNOSAT, 06 September 2024

Violent incidents in the West Bank between 07 October 2023 and 04 October 2024

Violence in the West Bank is fed by the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, militant groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), settler violence against Palestinians, and Israeli Defence Force (IDF) raids and attacks on civilians. Israel’s National Intelligence Directorate has reportedly warned of a potential escalation in the West Bank possibly reaching the scale of an intifada. Anger among Palestinians has been building gradually even before the 07 October attack in Israel, prompting the IDF to redeploy combat units from the Gaza front. Since the Gaza war, the quality and use of roadside bombs has reportedly increased, with new militant battalions emerging. Separately, Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a failed suicide bombing in Tel Aviv on 18 July 2024, highlighting evolving tactics to target Israel amidst the ongoing conflict.

Map Data: ACLED

Shelling and air strikes in Israel and Lebanon involving Israel and Hezbollah

The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has escalated, with Israel intensifying its operations deeper into Lebanon while targeting key Hezbollah commanders. In retaliation, Hezbollah has expanded its attacks further into northern Israel, focusing on military assets and civilian areas. Prior to the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on 27 September, the group had already begun using medium-range Fadi rockets alongside its short-range Falaq and Burkan rockets. These Fadi rockets allowed Hezbollah to extend its reach, targeting the outskirts of Tel Aviv and Haifa. On 22 September, Hezbollah used Fadi-1 and Fadi-2 rockets for the first time since hostilities began on 8 October 2023. Two days later, on 24 September, Hezbollah bombed Israel’s Samson Remote Controlled Weapon Station using Fadi-3 rockets, marking their debut in the conflict. On 1 October 2024, the group launched Fadi-4 rockets at Sde Dov Airbase near Tel Aviv. Despite Israel’s successful elimination of Hezbollah’s leadership and the substantial degradation of its command and control structures, Hezbollah continues to maintain significant operational capabilities. Israel’s decision on 17 September 2024 to broaden its objectives by securing the northern front and initiating 'limited incursions' against Hezbollah militants indicates that the conflict is likely to persist.

Map Data: ACLED

Forecast

Increased threat in the eastern Mediterranean Sea

The eastern Mediterranean has become an increasingly volatile region. Recent incidents, including the killing of an Israeli sailor and the targeting of critical assets like the Karish gas field have drawn attention to ongoing concerns over maritime security. Israeli military forces have also frequently intercepted drones targeting critical assets like the Karish gas field. Additionally, unverified claims of attacks in the eastern Mediterranean by Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Houthis highlight the potential risks posed to maritime security and regional economic interests, particularly those tied to energy infrastructure.

Increased threat to global energy supply

In response to Iran's unprecedented missile attack on Israel on 01 October, Israel may target Iranian oil and gas infrastructure. Ongoing geopolitical tensions have raised concerns about regional stability and the potential impact on global energy supply chains. Iran is the third-largest oil producer within OPEC and approximately one-fifth of the world's crude oil supply, along with significant volumes of liquefied natural gas, pass through the Strait of Hormuz. During times of increased geopolitical tensions, Iran has threatened to shut down this vital waterway.

Map Data: US Department of Energy Global Oil & Gas Features Database

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